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Abstract  
In recent years there has been a marked resurgence of interest in the areas of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and social and environmental accounting (SEA) among business, Governments, public policymakers, 
investors, unions, environmentalists and others.  While at one level there appears to be widespread 
agreement that CSR and SEA are worthy topics of attention, different groups have very different 
understandings of these fields.  This article provides a meta-analysis of these differences by comparing three 
broad approaches to SEA:  the business case, stakeholder-accountability and critical theory approaches.  It 
also responds to concerns a number of commentators have expressed regarding the current dominance of 
'business case' discourses.  While not seeking to impose on readers a 'correct' way of viewing SEA and CSR, 
exposure to competing perspectives is viewed as one way of challenging us to think more reflectively about 
the frames available to us and their implications for the social realities we construct, embed or seek to 
change. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years there has been a marked renewal of interest in the areas of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and social and environmental accounting (SEA).  Growing numbers 
of companies have begun to publish 'triple bottom line' and 'sustainable development' 
reports.  Governments, public policymakers, private sector organizations and professional 
bodies have set up working groups on various aspects of SEA and have issued a number 
of discussion papers and best practice guidelines (see, e.g., Commission of the European 
Communities, 2002; Fédération des experts Comptables Européens, 2003; Global 
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Reporting Initiative, 2002; AccountAbility, 2003). Groups such as socially responsible 
investors, trade unions and environmentalists have also expressed an active interest in the 
field (see, e.g., O'Rourke, 2003; European Trade Union Confederation and European 
Trade Union Technical Bureau, 2002; Gray and Bebbington, 2001). 
 
While at one level there appears to be widespread agreement that CSR and SEA are 
worthy topics of attention, it does not take more than a surface review of the literature to 
realize that different groups have very different starting points.  This article seeks to 
provide an overview of the conceptual landscape and to explore some of these 
differences by comparing three broad approaches to SEA:  the business case, 
stakeholder-accountability and critical theory approaches.  These approaches are based 
on fundamentally different understandings of the business-society interface which, in 
turn, lead to quite different views about why and how (if at all) the field should be 
developed.  They have a lengthy historical legacy (see, e.g., Wells, 2002; Gray et al., 
1996; Gray, 2002) and help to explain why the 'what', 'why', 'how' and 'to whom' of SEA 
is - and is likely to remain - such a contested terrain (Maltby, 1997, p 84; Bragd et al., 
1998).  In writing this article, we are also responding to concerns a number of 
commentators have expressed regarding the current dominance of 'business case' 
discourses (Welford, 1998; Gray et al., 1997; Owen et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2000; 
O'Dwyer, 2003; Milne et al., 2003).  While not seeking to impose on readers a 'correct' 
way of viewing SEA and CSR, exposure to competing perspectives in this type of meta-
analysis is viewed as one way of challenging us to think more reflectively about the 
frames available to us.  As is now widely recognized, discourses matter and have 
profound implications for the social realities we construct, embed or seek to change. 
 
 
Business Case Approach
 
 
Business case proponents - as the label implies - view CSR and SEA initiatives 
primarily from the perspective of 'what's in it for business and shareholders'?    
'Significant financial payback' is the response from growing numbers of corporate 
managers and business consultants.  Groups such as the World Business Council for 
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Sustainable Development (WBCSD), Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) and 
Business in the Community (BITC) have helped to spread this message internationally. 
 
Business case proponents tend to ignore, deny or gloss over conflicts of interest in 
business-society relationships (O'Dwyer, 2003).  The focus is on identifying and 
pursuing forms of CSR and SEA that result in 'win-wins' for both business and wider 
stakeholders.  CSR and SEA are primarily viewed as extensions of management's 
existing toolkit for enhancing shareholder wealth; offering 'a new generation of business 
opportunity' (Hedstrom et al., 1998).  The WBCSD (2003, p 15), for example, identifies 
the following business benefits from sustainable development reporting: 
 
• Creating financial value 
• Attracting long-term capital and favorable financing conditions 
• Raising awareness, motivating and aligning staff, and attracting talent 
• Improving management systems 
• Risk awareness 
• Encouraging innovation 
• Continuous improvement 
• Enhancing reputation 
• Transparency to stakeholders 
• Maintaining license to operate 
 
BITC (2003) outline a similar list of benefits for CSR and conclude that the rewards that 
can be gained from 'an effective business-led approach' (p 1) make the 'business case… 
compelling' (p 9).  Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2002, p 2), typical of the large 
accounting firms promoting SEA, advise that: 
 
Business leaders are increasingly acting upon this responsibility [to report] because it makes good 
business sense.  It helps companies to mitigate risk, protect corporate brand, and gain competitive 
advantage…   
 
SEA is also widely recognized as a way of managing threats to organizational 
legitimacy, for example, as 'key stakeholders perceive significant discrepancies between 
their own and the company's values' (ibid.).  Companies can use it to demonstrate 'their 
positive impact on society' (BITC, 2003, p 1) and to head off campaigns from NGOs 
and activists which have the potential to threaten business interests (Litvin, 2003).  
While SEA may not convince the 'radicals', it is likely to assist in controlling the 
perceptions of those groups most likely to identify with the organization (Neu et al.,  
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1998).   Indeed, legitimacy theory is one of the most widely used frameworks in 
explaining why organizations voluntarily engage in SEA (see Deegan, 2002 for an 
overview of this literature). 
 
Organizational legitimacy concerns are typically framed in terms of perceived rather 
than real conflicts of interests between business and stakeholders.  As in the accounting 
and industrial relations arena, managerial perspectives are underpinned by a unitarist 
perspective that is reluctant to admit conflict (Brown 2000).  O'Dwyer (2003, p 534), for 
example, found a general unwillingness among managers to accept the existence of 
situations where their economic and social responsibilities could conflict (although, 
when pressed, interviewees conceded that economic objectives would reign).  He also 
found a general resistance among managers in their capacity as managers to move 
beyond 'business as usual' although this was not necessarily consistent with their 
personal ('weekend') positions.   
 
Rather than seeing CSR and SEA as a managerial distraction or as a tradeoff against 
profits, business case proponents promote the idea of corporations managing their social 
environment as part of their core business activity.  Factoring social considerations into 
business decisions and playing a leadership role on social issues is also viewed as a way 
of promoting a 'light-handed' approach to regulation.   Von Tunzelmann and Cullwick 
(1996), for example, note that CSR can 'minimize the prospects of future regulation' (p 
91) and be regarded as 'an alternative to regulation of business activity' (p 103).   
 
CSR in this frame of reference is thus primarily situated in the traditional context of 
'creating value for the business (owners)', through a focus on the potential for 'win-win' 
relationships.  Understanding, managing and responding to stakeholder expectations is 
promoted as 'enlightened self-interest'.   
 
Business case proponents often back up their case by citing research that points to 
positive correlations between CSR activity, profits and shareholder returns (WBCSD, 
1997; Co-operative Insurance Society, 2002).  Closer analysis of the literature suggests  
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a more complex picture.*   Gray and Bebbington (2001, p 212) observe that much 
depends on how one defines 'ethical investment' and that the stronger the criteria 
applied, the more likely ethical funds are to 'underperform' relative to 'non-ethical' 
portfolios.   Managers of ethical funds have also complained about the lack of 
information available to adequately assess CSR performance (Rockness and Williams, 
1988). 
 
Not everyone in the business community is convinced that the business case for CSR 
stacks up.  Henderson (2001), in a paper published by the NZ Business Roundtable, 
acknowledges that the 'doctrine' of CSR is gaining support but argues that the ideas 
associated with it (e.g. corporate citizenship, stakeholders and sustainable development) 
have 'the potential to do real harm' and that its 'adoption by businesses generally…. 
would reduce community well-being and undermine the market economy' (p viii).   
Sternberg (1999, p 33) observes that 'corporate mission statements and political rhetoric 
promoting stakeholder theory may seem innocuous, but they are expressions of a deeply 
dangerous doctrine' that undermines private property.  Fears have been expressed that 
managers who promote their ethical image fuel public expectations, reinforcing 'the 
feeling that companies have a case to answer' (The Economist, 2002).  Some of the 
managers O'Dwyer (2002a) interviewed, reported that legitimating strategies were 
difficult, and possibly counter-productive, in the face of an increasingly cynical public.  
These managers felt that SEA: 
 
had exposed them to even greater demands and increased scepticism.  Apparent quests for 
legitimacy effectively backfired due to these disclosures being used in many instances as a stick 
with which to beat them… As the disclosures, which were positive in their nature and not overly 
comprehensive, were not perceived as reflecting actual performance (suggesting symbolic as 
opposed to substantive disclosure), the perceived legitimacy gap actually widened (p 424). 
 
Increased SEA as a response to criticism also implicitly grants legitimacy to stakeholder 
claims 'something the organization does not want to do' (Neu et al., 1998, p 272).  This 
could lead, in the longer run, to a redistribution of wealth and power to non-shareholder 
constituencies.  In this sense, even weak versions of sustainable development can be 
seen as 'the tip of the iceberg' (Springett, 2003, p 83).   
 
                                                 
*
   For a recent review, see Orlitzky et al. (2003). 
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Considerations such as these lead some commentators to urge full consideration of the 
likely costs and benefits of CSR and SEA to finance capital in any business case 
assessment.  Continuing debates within the business community seem likely given 
observations that there is increasing evidence suggesting that win-win opportunities - 
the 'low hanging fruit' - are becoming progressively less apparent for many firms 
(Hussain 1999, p 203). 
 
Table 1 summarises the key features of the business case approach. 
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
 
Stakeholder-Accountability Approach 
 
Stakeholder-accountability theorists view large corporations as quasi-public institutions 
and seek to promote a more open, transparent and democratic society (Gray et al., 1996; 
Gray, 2002).  While stakeholders share common interests, there is also considerable 
potential for conflicts of interest.    Briloff (1966), one of the earlier accounting 
commentators in this area, characterizes the responsibilities of accountants for 'fair 
corporate accountability' in terms of the duality of power and property: 
 
on the one hand we have those who sit in the seats of Power controlling the day-to-day usage of the 
asset complex of the corporation, and on the other hand we have Property, i.e., those who have an 
important stake in the way in which these assets and related power are utilized.  This Property 
group comprises the direct shareholders, of course, but also to be included are labor, consumers, 
the participants in the pension plan or insurance or bank fund which may have an investment in the 
corporation, and government generally - in fact in our inextricably interdependent existence it 
might fairly be said that all of us are involved in every major corporate enterprise (pp 51-52). 
 
Chen (1975) argues that management's primary stewardship responsibility is to society 
and that managerial performance 'should be evaluated in terms of both profit and the 
accomplishment of social objectives' (p 542) and that this aspect had been long 
neglected by the accounting profession. 
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Gray (1998), writing some 25 years later, still seeks to encourage a 'democratic 
evolution' by designing accounting so as to increase transparency and accountability, 
particularly of powerful institutions and organizations:  
  
Such a view is predicated upon the rights to information of the polity in a democracy… and argues, 
in an increasingly secretive and complex world, for a commensurate increase in the transparency of 
the organisations which control and determine our futures (p 209). 
 
Accountability in its core sense means 'being called to account for one's actions' 
(Mulgan, 2000, p 555).  Accounting helps to make things account-able and provides an 
important mechanism of social control.  From a stakeholder perspective, responsiveness 
to the multiplicity of constituencies interested in corporate performance requires a form 
of plural accountability.   Groups such as employees, consumers and local communities 
have a 'right to know' (Swift, 2001) and to then apply rewards and sanctions through 
'exit', 'voice' or 'loyalty' options.   The capability for stakeholders to both reward and 
impose sanctions is a key component in the accountability process.  Given the pluralist 
nature of the relationships, it cannot be assumed that all groups will agree on what the 
relevant dimensions of performance are or, indeed, on what constitutes 'good' or 'bad' 
performance.   
 
Stakeholder-accountability is also increasingly viewed as a process 'in which people and 
records must interact to achieve accountability' (Yakel, 2001, p 234).  Roberts (1991) 
shows how 'individualizing' and 'socializing' forms of accountability contribute to 
different understandings of the self and our relationships to others.  He urges a search 
for more integrative models of accountability that reflect both our separateness and 
interdependence.  Lehman (1999) advocates adoption of a communitarian framework.  
He urges that in an era of supranational corporations, increased attention needs to be 
paid to expanding the public sphere and using SEA to facilitate informed public 
dialogue and debate through civic institutions.  New ways are required to govern the 
'global commons'.  Rather than relying on corporations as agents of change, he calls for 
a repoliticisation of 'not only society but also its basic institutions - one of which is 
accounting' (p 237).  His concern is for SEA to be  developed 'as part of a public sphere 
committed to exposing and explaining corporate effects on 'the world' and to reflecting 
on what is 'significant' for communities' (Lehman, 2002, p 220).   
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Stakeholder-accountability proponents argue that it is debatable how much is new in the 
business case approach to CSR and SEA.  'Strategic SEA' is pretty much 'business as 
usual'.  It rests on a neo-classical economic understanding of management's 'right to 
manage' and of the corporation as primarily a vehicle for shareholder wealth 
maximization.  The focus is still on what is value adding for companies.  Business still 
sets the agenda, with any stakeholder engagement occurring primarily on management's 
terms.  As Owen et al. (2000) put it: 
 
management take control of the whole process (including the degree of stakeholder inclusion) by 
strategically collecting and disseminating only the information it deems appropriate to advance the 
corporate image, rather than being truly transparent and accountable… (p 85). 
 
 
The primary concern 'is with society's impact on business rather than business's impact 
on society' (O'Dwyer, 2003, p 527).  Organisations decide 'whom they perceive to be a 
party to a social contract' (Swift, 2001, p 17).  Employees, consumers, and community 
groups are to be 'looked after' and 'reported to' to the extent that it benefits corporate 
profits and ultimately the 'owners' of the firm.  Managers, as the agents of equity capital, 
remain accountable solely to shareholders for their decision-making.  The business case 
approach thus leads at best to: 
 
a 'soft' form of accountability, whereby organisations engage in stakeholder dialogue for the 
purpose of voluntary self-reporting on their trustworthiness as part of a reputation building process 
(Owen et al., 2001, p 275). 
 
Powerless stakeholders can safely be ignored.  Fundamentally, there appears to be little 
debate between Friedmanites and business case proponents.  As management 
consultants MHC International put it, 'properly defined' CSR is profit maximizing 
(MHC International, 2004, emphasis added).  Far from reflecting a genuine social 
advance, such initiatives appear decidedly manipulative to those who favour a 
stakeholder-accountability rather than stakeholder-management view of the firm.    
 
A number of business case proponents concede that economic self-interest is the clear 
motivation for companies trying to demonstrate 'social leadership'.  It is tempting to take 
the attitude that 'if everyone wins', so what?  For stakeholder-accountability proponents 
to the extent that the business case approach highlights the interdependent nature of 
business-society relationships, this work is to be encouraged.  Where 'double-wins' are 
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possible, it provides managers and others who wish to take account of the broader 
effects of corporate activity and make more 'socially efficient' decisions with a 
commercially acceptable rationalization.  Translating issues into terms monolingual 
'profit-speak' colleagues understand may help to expand the set of 'legitimate options'.†  
This may provide a strategy for managers who report personal experiences of openly 
ethical reasoning impeding a successful business career (Nielsen, 1987). 
 
Stakeholder-accountability advocates have no quarrel with the idea that stakeholder-
business relationships can be mutually beneficial. A firm that treats its employees 
decently may well reap benefits through increased productivity.  Similarly, business 
must have regard for evolving social attitudes and expectations if it is to maintain its 
'social licence'.  However, stakeholder theorists note that the business case typically 
proceeds as if there is a self-evident harmony of interests between managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  Business case proponents are silent about what 
should be done once the gains from the 'low hanging fruit' of win-wins have been 
realized (Prakash, 2002).  Where conflicts of interests are recognised, the priority of 
shareholder claims is taken for granted.  Stakeholder-accountability advocates struggle 
with both of these propositions.  For them, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that 
many companies are more concerned with the image rather than the substance of 
'corporate citizenship' and 'sustainable development'.   
 
The stakeholder-accountability framework recognizes the significant economic, social 
and political power that major corporates wield in contemporary society.  It is based on 
the idea that, in the final analysis, corporations exist because the polity allows them to, 
that corporates are accountable for the use of the vast financial, human and community 
resources entrusted to them and that affected parties need safeguards against potential 
abuses of corporate power (e.g. through various forms of stakeholder legislation).  
Information is viewed as providing an important monitoring role in this process.  This  
                                                 
†
   This approach has its limitations.  Michalos (1995, pp 54-59) argues that the idea that managers ought 
to be socially responsible 'because there is money in it' is the worst argument for CSR.  See also British 
Telecommunications (2003). 
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has long been recognized for the shareholder constituency (Ijiri, 1975); stakeholder-
accountability theorists seek an extension to help protect the interests of other 
stakeholder groups. 
 
Greater access to SEA information is viewed as an essential part of increasing 
transparency surrounding corporate activity and its consequences for stakeholders.  It 
thus becomes a way of determining whether firms are playing according to the 'rules of 
the game' and a basis for questioning the terms of a firm's 'social contract' (which will 
change over time).  As with the business case approach, there is recognition of the 
behavioural potential of reporting requirements but the focus is now on managerial 
behaviour: 
 
power corrupts less when accounted for - because if decision-makers know they may be called 
upon to explain and justify the use of their powers, they are far more likely to make more 
considered and equitable decisions than they otherwise might… Business power is not - or should 
not be - exempt from all this.  It is… comparable to the power exercised by other major 
organisations - for example, for its effects on employees, consumers, the physical environment; and 
on local, regional and national priorities and development…  (Medawar, 1978, p 473). 
 
This is similar to the 'sunlight is the best of disinfectants' philosophy that has 
underpinned much capital markets disclosure (Langevoort, 2001).  The monitoring of 
social and environmental performance is arguably particularly important in a 
commercial environment where organisational incentives and socialization processes 
have traditionally emphasised the 'shareholder primacy' norm.   Regulation is usually 
also supported on the basis that it secures information rights for stakeholders and is 
likely to lead to more balanced reporting (e.g. 'bad' as well as 'good' news disclosures). 
 
Stakeholder-accountability literature is also frequently associated with calls for more 
participatory institutions and forms of corporate governance, where stakeholders have 
more voice in the decisions which affect them (Kelly, 2001).  Information disclosure is 
viewed as a vital pre-requisite for informed participation (Brown, 2000, pp 54-55).  
More traditional channels of accountability such as annual reports need to be 
supplemented with access to 'raw' forms of data (more typically associated with 
management accounting systems) that allow for active engagement by stakeholders.  
The central aim is to encourage more democratic dialogue.  From this perspective: 
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any form of social and environmental accounting (and much financial accounting) will produce 
outputs which are contestable and open to debate.  The utility of such accounting is not in its 
representation of 'infallible truth' but in its creation of a range of environmental and social 
visibilities and exposure of values and priorities that become inputs to wider democratic processes 
of discourse and decision making (Boyce, 2000, p 53). 
 
Accounting thereby helps to create new visibilities and facilitate discussion and debate 
among interested parties.  It promotes dialogic rather than monologic conceptions of 
reason and thus facilitates the 'layers' of talk required in a multi-perspectival 
environment (Morgan, 1988).  The aim is to open up conversations, not close them 
down with 'incontrovertible bottom lines' (Boyce, 2000, p 55).  'Accounts' are explicitly 
understood as interpretations which recipients are free to accept or contest. 
 
The role of SEA under the stakeholder-accountability approach has elements in 
common with traditional accounting - to provide information for accountability 
purposes (assessing managerial performance and monitoring compliance with 
legislative, regulatory and contractual arrangements) and assisting users to make 
informed decisions.   However, stakeholder-accountability proponents firmly reject the 
dominance of shareholders and capital markets that has been the conventional focus of 
accounting.  In line with its stakeholder orientation, this approach is underpinned by a 
far broader understanding of user constituencies and the performance under scrutiny. 
 
For this group sustainable development is unlikely to be compatible with the 
neoclassical economic paradigm.  There is concern for 'eco-/social justice' as well as 
'eco-/social efficiency' aspects of sustainability along with a questioning of the rhetoric 
that 'economic growth benefits everyone' (Lehman, 2002, p 220).  There is concern that 
the managerialist agenda of SEA has defined out the more 'explicitly political' areas 
such as 'poverty, fair trade, propaganda etc. etc.' (Bebbington et al., 1999, p 51).  There 
is strong interest in more democratic approaches to corporate governance (Millon, 1993; 
Kelly, 2001), a more participatory political culture generally (Boyce, 2000; Grolin, 
1998) and in linking micro and macro levels of reporting (see, e.g., Bebbington et al., 
2001 on measures to promote the internalization of 'externalities'; Bartelmus, 1999 on  
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'greening' the national accounts).   This will require more explicit attention to the 
surfacing and institutionalisation of competing perspectives and interests. 
 
Stakeholder-accountability theorists are dismissive of much current SEA practice.  It is 
criticized for its poor quality (e.g. in terms of its incompleteness, selective nature and 
inadequate audit) and managerialist focus, offering little, if anything, in the way of real 
accountability (see, e.g., Ball et al., 2000; Gray et al., 1997; Owen et al., 2000, 2001; 
O'Dwyer, 2003).  Adams (2001), in her study of ICI's reporting, highlights the 
performative contradictions between management's rhetoric in annual reports and 
evidence available from external sources:  
 
The ICI reports portray the company as one which is doing very well, trying very hard and seeking 
to do better.  In contrast, the impression one gets of ICI’s impacts and efforts to curtail them from 
external sources is very different from the impression one is left with from reading the ICI reports 
alone (p 17).  
 
 O'Dwyer et al. (2003), in a study of stakeholder perspectives, found that current 
practice was widely viewed 'as little more than an untrustworthy symbolic stakeholder 
management exercise with little concern for 'true' accountability' (p 1).  NGOs also 
reported feeling powerless in terms of their potential influence on SEA practice.   
Reporting is viewed as a 'banking' rather than a 'dialogic' practice: 
 
reports are there to tell a more or less passive audience that 'everything' is fine and to discourage 
further questioning of the organisation… [The business case approach], focused around reputation 
management… retains the model of the company as being the all powerful, all knowing teacher and 
the report audiences being 'ignorant' and needing to be filled up with relevant knowledge so they 
will be docile in the face of organisational activities (Thomson and Bebbington, forthcoming, p 
15).  
 
Many commentators argue that this uneven playing field has been exacerbated by the 
absence of effective legislation (Owen et al., 2001; Swift, 2001).  As Gray (cited in Dey 
2003, p 6) puts it, 'accountability should hurt' and it seems unlikely that self-regulation 
will deliver on this score.   
 
Table 2 summarises the key features of the stakeholder-accountability approach. 
 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
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Critical Theory Approach 
 
The critical theory or 'radical' approach is essentially a critique of the stakeholder-
accountability approach to CSR and SEA.  Advocates of this position are skeptical 
about the potential for 'real accountability' in the absence of radical change in capitalist 
society.  They warn of the dangers of acting 'as if' we live in a pluralist society.  While 
concepts like 'stakeholders', 'democratic dialogue' and 'triple bottom lines' sound nice in 
theory, imbalances of power and resources mean that most efforts in this area will 'do 
nothing but prop up inequitable and alienating societal structures' (Burritt and Welch 
1997, p 3).  Global capitalism has led to a narrowing of democratic debate and the 
rolling back of the State, promoting a 'democracy of elites' (Lehman, 2002, p 223).  
While communitarian approaches to accountability may be an advance over narrow 
liberal models, there is still the difficulty that communities may simply 'reflect and 
reproduce the power imbalances that are a part of current systems' (Walker, 2002, p 71). 
 
For critical theorists, the dominance of capital-oriented values and perspectives is such 
that CSR and SEA are likely to fall victim to business capture and lead to mystification 
rather than liberation.   Springett (2003), for example, points to the way that the 
sustainable development agenda has been appropriated by business interests, charging 
that the discourse led by groups such as the WBCSD has: 
 
largely sought to tame the concept to mean no more than a level of social and environmental 
engagement that corporations can easily accommodate - even use to burnish their brand… [This] 
eco-modernist paradigm comfortably appropriates aspects of the shift to sustainable development - 
those that concern business risk and 'eco-efficient' use of resources that cut business costs - 
deflecting demands for more radical change and subsuming into the traditional business model the 
rhetoric of greener business as usual… (p 74). 
 
Eco-efficiency thus serves to embed existing structures.  Rather than occupying centre 
stage, social and environmental issues remain 'appendages which drop off when the 
going gets tough' (Welford, 1998, p 3). 
 
According to this view, voluntarist CSR and SEA initiatives are most realistically 
viewed as forms of disinformation and 'greenwash' which camouflage more sinister 
corporate agendas: 
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Behind the green PR is a deeper corporate political strategy: to get the world's governments to 
allow corporations to police themselves through voluntary codes of conduct, win-win partnerships 
and best practices learning models, rather than binding legislation and regulation. We call the 
corporate strategy of weakening national and international environmental agreements while 
promoting voluntary measures Deep Greenwash.  Deep Greenwash may occur behind the scenes or 
in coordination with public forms of greenwash such as environmental image advertising 
(CorpWatch, 2001). 
 
Not surprisingly then, there is considerable criticism of SEA proponents who seek to 
occupy and engage with the so-called 'middle ground' (which, for critical theorists, is 
subject to ongoing social struggles and thus will inevitably be in a state of constant 
transformation).  By emphasising pragmatism and moderation, middle-of-the-road 
thinkers implicitly promote conservative agendas.  At best, they are likely to contribute 
to little more than 'rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic' (Puxty, 1986, p 107).  To 
pretend otherwise, is 'to misread the nature of capitalist social relations' (Trotter, 2000).  
Being 'eager to do something' is not enough (Lehman, 2002, p 220, emphasis in 
original). 
 
If CSR and SEA are best viewed as ideological weapons, can they be used to promote 
counter-hegemonies aimed at transforming the status quo?   Critical theorists believe 
they can, but that this is best done by highlighting rather than downplaying social 
conflicts and struggles.  SEA in the form of adversarial accounting and externally 
prepared 'anti-reports' can be used to expose the basic contradictions and exploitative 
aspects of the capitalist system and thereby challenge the status quo: 
 
The radical accounting rubric incorporates several streams of research.  Some studies examine the 
conflictual underpinnings of taken-for-granted concepts (profit, wealth, net present value, and 
efficiency), and the neo-classical foundations on which they rest…  Others review the genealogies 
of accounting discourses and their mutability in different social and organisational contexts… And 
still other radical research explores accounting's role as an ideological weapon in social conflict 
over social wealth… (Tinker et al., 1991,  p 37). 
 
Arnold and Hammond (1994, p 111) seek to have social accounting constructed 'as a 
site where subordinate groups and social movements can challenge dominant economic 
interests'.  They examine the South African divestment debates of the 1970s and 1980s 
to demonstrate how accounting 'can serve contradictory political interests'.  By giving 
voice to alternative worldviews, social accounting has 'considerable disruptive and 
counter-hegemonic power' (Bebbington et al., 1999, p 49). 
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More recently, Dey (2003) has recommended the use of 'shadow' reports whereby 
commentators use alternative sources of information (e.g. media, anti-corporate 
websites) to help expose gaps between what companies choose to report about their 
activities and what they conceal.  This practice has its roots in the external social audits 
of the 1970s (Medawar, 1976; Harte and Owen, 1987).  Dey (2003, pp 8-9) observes 
that the growth of the internet has provided access to far more 'counter-information' 
sources and that shadow reports might help to provide the conditions for real dialogue 
between corporates and stakeholders. 
 
Noting the high degree of social interdependence in capitalist societies, and the public 
disapprobation firms such as Nike, Shell Oil and Exxon have faced in recent years, 
Tinker and Carter (2002) observe that: 
 
if corporations disclose accounting income achieved as a result [of] environmental degradation, 
harmful products, or abusive labor practices, these practices may come back to haunt investors in 
the form of litigation, consumer boycotts, union action, or even (for WTO-connected 
multinationals) public disorder (p 114). 
 
The advent of the internet has not only provided better access to information but also 
facilitated the increase of public pressure on multinationals.  As Hastings (1999, p 270) 
puts it, 'a criticized company can be affected financially more readily and more globally 
than in the past'. 
 
Short of attempts at counter-narratives, SEA is more likely to strengthen rather than 
weaken inequitable power distributions.  Critical theorists are thus extremely wary of 
so-called 'partnership' approaches between business and 'stakeholders' and attempts to 
engage with firms in social accounting experiments (although, as will be seen below, 
some do see these as offering opportunities for the development of democratic 
consciousness).   They point out that social accountants themselves admit they have had 
a low level of 'emancipatory success' (see, e.g., Owen et al., 2000; Dey, 2000;  O'Dwyer, 
2002b).   Furthermore, powerful groups can point to the existence of SEA 'as evidence 
of their openness in listening to criticism' leading to the legitimization and extension of 
their power (Puxty, 1991, p 37).  Dialogue in such situations is a farce: 
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True dialogue takes place only among equals.  There is no dialogue across the boundary between 
masters and servants, for the master will listen only as long as his power remains intact, and the 
servant will limit his communication to utterances for which he cannot be punished.  In fact, to 
recommend dialogue in a situation of inequality of power is a deceptive ideology of the powerful, 
who wish to persuade the powerless that harmony and mutual understanding are possible in society 
without any change in the status quo of power (Baum 1977, pp 43-44 cited in Swift, 2001, p 23). 
 
There is a fear that most current efforts are more likely to reinforce the 'eco-modernist' 
path (Welford, 1998) than facilitate much-needed social change.  Engagement - if it is to 
have any chance - needs to be informed by critical perspectives on meso and macro-
level social change (Dey, 2002).  This requires an emphasis on reflection, the 
exploration of unexamined assumptions, ideological strategies and dialectical awareness 
of tensions and contradictions that can lead to radical transformations (Tinker and Gray, 
2003; Carr, 2000).  Academics need to act as 'confronters of orthodoxy' and to unsettle 
established 'regimes of truth' (Sikka et al., 1995, pp 115).    For some, the dangers of 
incorporation are such that 'it is better to retire to a leftist couch and allow capitalism to 
self-destruct of its own internal volition' (Tinker and Gray, 2003, p 749). 
 
Critical theorists also urge caution in terms of theorizing the role of regulation; pluralist 
conceptualizations of the State as 'a neutral marketplace where aggregate social 
preference is expressed' are rejected as naive (Arnold 1990, p 179).  While agreeing that 
legislation is important in securing information rights, they are ever watchful for 
attempts to emasculate the regulatory process (e.g. through the structuring of agendas, 
restricting participation and conservative judicial interpretations). 
 
Some more 'pluralist' radicals (or 'radical' pluralists depending on how one views their 
placement on the continuum of perspectives outlined in this paper) favour 'engaging' in 
a less confrontational way and are more optimistic about the possibilities of engaging 
with practice in an attempt to achieve change (see, e.g., Bebbington, 1997; Bebbington 
et al.,1999; Gray, 2002).  They accept that there is evidence of capture in the SEA 
project, but observe that it is not complete.  Some managers do recognize the need for 
substantial change.  SEA has opened up opportunities for them to question current 
practice and allowed 'new forms of discourse both within the organization and between 
the organization and external participants' (Bebbington, 1997, p 369 citing Gray et al.  
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1995).  Exposure to alternative accounts may encourage others to reflect on their 
understandings of CSR and thus 'make a difference' to 'how managers think and act' 
(Friedman and Miles, 2002, p 2).  Attention to technical detail, for example developing 
methods to internalize externalities, helps to avert excuses made in the 1970s; 'it is a 
good idea but cannot be done' (Tinker and Gray 2003, p 748).   
 
From this perspective, SEA helps to create and encourage different situational logics 
and contributes to sowing the seeds for structural change.  Alliances with 
philosophically sympathetic groups such as NGOs and trade unions may also help to 
increase external pressure for change.  Growing attention is also being paid to the 
'enabling potential' of SEA education through its consciousness-raising capacity 
(Humphrey et al., 1996; Bebbington, 1997; Tinker and Gray, 2003).   This includes 
improving the literacy of SEA academics by exposing them to the theoretical critique of 
social accounting.  Gray (2002) argues that while theorization of the processes of social 
change may be under-specified, to accept capture as a reason for dis-engagement is 
similar to 'fiddling while Rome burns': 
 
Such developments will be captured to some degree - how could they not be?  But the degree to which 
they are captured depends (at least in part) on the extent of engagement by those with concerns in the 
field - the willingness of social (and alternative/critical?) accountants to refuse to yield the field to 
corporate autonomy without a fight… To bleat about engagement and the purity of the 
alternative/critical soul is fiddling while Rome burns, and 'Rome' is certainly burning (pp 700-701, 
emphasis in original). 
 
 
Whether a more confrontational or collaborative praxis is favoured, critical theorists 
agree that SEA protagonists 'inevitably take sides in social conflict and… 'responsible' 
[actors]… strive to ensure that their choice is a socially well-informed one' (Tinker et 
al., 1991, p 29).  They also agree that 'the over turn - or at least a massive reinvention - 
of capitalism' is needed to make real societal progress (Tinker and Gray, 2003, p 750). 
 
Table 3 summarises and compares the key features of the three broad approaches to 
SEA and CSR. 
 
 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
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Conclusions 
 
This article has considered how SEA is perceived and constructed within three very 
different frames of references.  It has highlighted the tensions and contradictions among 
the various social actors that have an interest in this field.  In doing so we hope that we 
have provided a more complete picture than accounts which focus on a single frame of 
reference.  SEA is an interpretively complex field.   These competing discourses - 
business case, stakeholder-accountability and critical theory - have important 
implications for the social realities we construct, embed or seek to change.  Their 
visibilities (and silences) are evident in a number of arenas including, inter alia, 
business, research, education, and public policy settings.   
 
It is not our intention to impose on readers a 'correct' way of viewing SEA and CSR.  
However, like many other commentators, we are concerned about the current dominance 
of the business case discourse which appears to be a case of powerful elites steering 
society 'in a direction which solidifies their own dominance' (Welford, 1988, p 9;  see 
also Gray et al., 1997; Owen et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2000; O'Dwyer, 2003; Milne et al., 
2003).  Too often the business case approach is presented as 'the only discourse in town', 
claiming a misplaced neutrality and objectivity.  Exposure to competing perspectives 
provides one form of antidote: 
 
If it is true that [objectivity] is grounded in the apparent perspectivelessness of the dominant 
discourse, then the introduction of competing perspectives can destabilize this apparent objectivity. 
More importantly, creating space for competing perspectives can loosen the constraints upon those 
who have been forced to adopt a perspective which is often at odds with their reality (Crenshaw, 
1994, p 48). 
 
 
In sketching out alternative approaches, we hope to provide those who have uncritically 
bought into the business case agenda something new to think about.  We also hope to 
provide those fresh to the discussions an introduction to some of the controversies and 
the conceptual choices available to them.  For those more familiar with the territory, the 
aim is to reinforce an appreciation of the complexity of the theoretical landscape. 
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Table 1 
 
 Business Case 
Purpose CSR/SEA is viewed as an extension of management's existing toolkit for 
enhancing shareholder value.  CSR/SEA should result in 'win-wins'.  If (and only 
if) reputation, social-marketing, good employee relations etc. provide additional 
'wealth' will CSR/SEA proceed. 
 
Key Assumptions Shareholder primacy is assumed above all other stakeholders.  Focus on 
stakeholder-management rather than stakeholder-accountability. 
 
Regulation Generally favour a 'voluntarist' approach.  Regulation raises compliance costs, is 
too inflexible and could impose 'costly' CSR/SEA on business. 
 
Role of 
Stakeholders 
CSR/SEA will involve 'consulting' with stakeholders. 
Future of 
CSR/SEA 
CSR/SEA requires more focus on 'technical' activities such as the development of 
performance measures and benchmarking techniques. 
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Table 2 
 
 Stakeholder-Accountability 
Purpose CSR/SEA should increase the accountability and transparency of organisations. This 
may involve additional costs to organisations.  Accountability and transparency are 
central components of a democratic society. 
 
Key 
Assumptions 
Various stakeholders have ‘information rights’ which must be acknowledged for 
decision-making purposes and to protect against potential abuses of corporate power.  
Shareholder primacy is not assumed. 
 
Regulation Regulation is necessary to ensure balanced reporting for accountability, monitoring 
and decision-making purposes.  Otherwise, risk of 'greenwash' is too high. 
 
Role of 
Stakeholders 
Stakeholders must 'meaningfully participate' in organisational decisions/reporting. 
Future of 
CSR/SEA 
Operationalisation of CSR/SEA is inevitably political.  Intervention by regulatory 
bodies (with stakeholder participation) is required to develop meaningful 
accountability measures. 
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Table 3 
 
 Business Case Stakeholder-
Accountability 
Critical 
Theory 
 
Purpose CSR/SEA is viewed as an 
extension of management's 
existing toolkit for 
enhancing shareholder 
value.  CSR/SEA should 
result in 'win-wins'. If (and 
only if) reputation, social-
marketing, good employee 
relations etc. provide 
additional 'wealth' will 
CSR/SEA go-ahead.  
 
CSR/SEA should increase 
the accountability and 
transparency of 
organisations. This may 
involve additional costs to 
organisations. 
Accountability and 
transparency are central 
components of a 
democratic society. 
CSR/SEA should expose 
the basic contradictions 
and exploitative aspects of 
the capitalist system.  
Environmental 
degradation and social 
inequities should be 
highlighted. 
Key 
Assumptions 
Shareholder primacy is 
assumed above all other 
stakeholders.  Focus on 
stakeholder-management 
rather than stakeholder-
accountability. 
Various stakeholders  
have ‘information rights’ 
which must be 
acknowledged for 
decision-making purposes 
and  to protect against 
potential abuses of 
corporate power.  
Shareholder primacy is 
not assumed. 
 
Sceptical about the 
potential for 'real 
accountability' in the 
absence of radical change 
in capitalist society.  
Dangers in acting 'as if' we 
live in a pluralist society. 
Regulation Generally favour a 
'voluntarist' approach.  
Regulation raises 
compliance costs, is too 
inflexible and could 
impose 'costly' CSR on 
business. 
 
Regulation is necessary to 
ensure balanced reporting 
for accountability, 
monitoring and decision-
making purposes.  
Otherwise, risk of 
'greenwash' is too high. 
Legislation is important in 
securing information 
rights.  However, need to 
be wary of opportunities 
elites have to emasculate 
regulatory processes (e.g. 
through agenda-setting 
and pseudo-participation). 
 
Role of 
Stakeholders 
SEA/CSR will involve 
'consulting' with 
stakeholders. 
Stakeholders must 
'meaningfully participate' 
in organisational 
decisions/reporting. 
 
Meaningful 'engagement' 
is unlikely within current 
governance structures.   
Future of 
CSR/SEA 
CSR/SEA requires more 
focus on 'technical' 
activities such as the 
development of 
performance measures and 
benchmarking techniques. 
Operationalisation of 
CSR/SEA is inevitably 
political.  Intervention by 
regulatory bodies (with 
stakeholder participation) 
is required to develop 
meaningful accountability 
measures. 
Current economic system 
requires radical change.  
Dominance of capital-
oriented values and 
perspectives means 
CSR/SEA likely to fall 
victim to business capture.  
Stakeholders may be 
better to rely on externally 
prepared 'anti-reports'. 
 
 
 
